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The Constitutional Scholar©
IRWIN P. STOTZKY*
Owen Fiss is one of the great constitutional scholars and teachers of
his generation. His writings have had a profound impact on the work of
thousands of students, scholars, practitioners, and judges, and on the law
itself. His view of family and friendship, broad and all encompassing,
including, of course, students and colleagues alike, has made him an
even more important and varied role model than any scholarship would
suggest.
In this symposium, we celebrate his many contributions to legal
scholarship, but not only because of the high quality of his work. We
celebrate his contributions because of the powerful moral force he brings
to that scholarship and because the personal and professional integrity
and the intellectual rigor with which he approaches his tasks are beyond
reproach. These attributes are especially significant today, when much
of the population, particularly members of the bar and academic law-
yers, feels so alienated from the historic function played by the federal
courts in perpetuating a highly moral body of learning known as consti-
tutional law.
Lawyers who came of age in previous generations, such as Owen,
saw the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as the federal circuit
and district courts, and even some state courts, as institutions worthy of
their highest respect, admiration, and support. Presently, however, fed-
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eral courts are often seen as hostile and uncommitted to our most prized
national ideals of equality and justice under the law.' They are fre-
quently seen as institutions dedicated to protecting the status quo and
increasing the power of those who serve it, such as officials of the Exec-
utive Branch.2
It is, therefore, not an exaggeration to say that Owen Fiss is an
important scholar who possesses qualities that have long since gone out
of style, but which are integrally related to the fragile art of constitu-
tional adjudication and to the pursuit of substantive justice. He repre-
sents the best ideals of the legal institutions that created the impetus for
the most significant changes in the history of the republic, including, not
least of all, the quest for racial equality. Being entirely cynical, even
hostile, about the positive role that courts may play in assuring justice in
our society - a view I have certainly held and I suspect some of the
participants in this symposium issue may also hold - jeopardizes the
significant achievements of constitutional scholars and of federal courts
in profound ways. Owen Fiss is so important both as a scholar and as a
moral force because he constantly confronts that cynicism and attacks it
in ways that are difficult to ignore. His work forces us to "stand within
the law and test the government's actions by the law."3
It is perhaps easier to understand my views about the importance of
Owen Fiss's work if I set the context for my conclusions. On many
significant levels - intellectual, political, and social - Owen Fiss
came of age in his conceptions of the role the judiciary should play in
our society in the 1960s and early to mid-1970s. This was, of course,
during the heyday of the Warren Court, a remarkable era of Supreme
Court history that can be said to have started with Brown v. Board of
Education4 in the mid-1950s, and to have reached its most dazzling
heights during the early to mid-1960s when the progressive wing of the
Court achieved a strong majority. This was the golden age of American
law, the era of Justices Warren, Black, Brennan, Douglas, Fortas,
Goldberg, and Marshall, among others. Although Chief Justice Earl
Warren retired in 1969, the extraordinary phase of legal history that
bears his name continued into the early 1970s. Owen Fiss played an
important role in this golden age. His timing for being involved in great
events was - and still is - impeccable. In 1964, he clerked for Judge
Thurgood Marshall on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit. During the 1965 term, he served as Justice William J. Bren-
1. Many would cite Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), as the most recent example.
2. The litigation over the terrorism cases is a prime example. See Owen Fiss, In the Shadow
of War, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 449 (2003).
3. Id. at 470.
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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nan's clerk on the Supreme Court. He then spent two years in the Civil
Rights Division of the Justice Department. He lived and participated
directly in these amazing times and events.
The foundation of the Warren Court jurisprudence had its anteced-
ents in earlier Supreme Court periods. Most particularly, these founda-
tions are reflected in some of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the
1930s. During the Warren Court period, for example, the Court took the
dissents written by Justices Holmes and Brandeis and turned them into
majority positions, thus elevating the principle of freedom of speech into
a significant set of values of American society.5 Simultaneously, the
Court began to intervene in criminal proceedings to assure a minimum
level of procedural fairness.
Even with these roots as background, however, the Warren Court
represented an almost completely new experiment in judicial decision-
making. There was clearly something unique, indeed special, about that
Court. Brown, for example, undertook the most daunting of all constitu-
tional jobs: making America's historic promise of racial equality in all
aspects of political and social life a reality. But Brown stood for even
more than this incredible challenge. It stood for an entirely new vision
of constitutional law that grew into a set of cases that resulted in signifi-
cant constitutional reform of the entire institutional structure of our state
and federal governments. In pursuit of this vision, the Warren Court
used the Civil War Amendments, particularly the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and the Bill of Rights as the basis for evaluating the then-accepted
order. By so doing, the Court changed the entire range of relationships
between the citizen and the state and federal governments.
The Warren Court nationalized a set of rights reflected in these
amendments. For example, no longer could a man charged with a crime
in State A be given virtually no procedural protections or be treated with
fewer procedural protections than one charged with the same crime in
State B. Both would now have to be treated with an equivalent mini-
mum of procedural protections. Convictions would no longer be based
on evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment or on state-
ments physically or psychologically coerced from the accused in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment. Trials would no longer be allowed
without the right to counsel or the right to a jury of the accused's peers.
In addition, the Warren Court placed legal barriers on the death penalty,
made sure the welfare system was not administered in an arbitrary and
5. It was not until this period that the Supreme Court began to create and take seriously the
tradition of protecting citizens from prosecution for seditious libel. The idea that democracy
demands a right to criticize government became the central meaning of the First Amendment. See
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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capricious manner, stopped the state governments from imposing poll
taxes, protected radical speech, and allowed the dissemination of infor-
mation concerning contraception. Indeed, many government practices
of the 1950s and early 1960s disproportionately affected the poor and
otherwise disadvantaged. The Warren Court attacked this invidious dis-
crimination with vigor.
These were only some of the extremely difficult challenges faced
by the Warren Court. The Court not only spoke to these issues, but
attacked them systematically and, by and large, successfully. In dealing
with these matters, the Supreme Court acted with the strong support of
many sectors of society, such as the civil rights and welfare rights move-
ments. It did not, and could not, act without such political and social
support. Law reflects and is reflected in social movements. Indeed, the
federal courts often looked to the executive and legislative branches for
support during the most critical times of change.
But, in my opinion, it was the Warren Court and the lower federal
courts of that era that acted as a catalyst for these bold reforms. The
federal courts inspired and protected the people who sought to imple-
ment those changes. To put it another way, constitutional and statutory
law became both an object as well as a subject. Employing that law, the
federal judiciary created a centrifugal force for change, and was itself
inspired and empowered by those political and social changes. Owen
Fiss's scholarship can surely be seen as deriving from many of the War-
ren Court's decisions, and especially from the vision of judicial deci-
sion-making created by that Court.
A constitutional program that was so revolutionary is certain to face
powerful opposition. The assault began in the early 1960s. By 1980,
the Warren Court's jurisprudence was essentially gutted. As only one
example, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts attacked Brown and its prog-
eny. Although the Court did not expressly overrule Brown, it ruled, for
example, that it is constitutional in some circumstances for a school sys-
tem to contain a large number of all-black and all-white schools.6 The
Rehnquist Court has shifted the emphasis of Brown, indeed turned it
topsy-turvy, and, in so doing, severely limited the nature of the remedy.
As a result, Brown has lost much of its strength, energy, and moral
power.
In other areas, such as freedom of speech, the Rehnquist Court cre-
ated new power for the state and certain private interests. The Court's
strong commitment to what Justice Brennan called "uninhibited, robust,
6. See, e.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Ed. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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and wide-open"7 debate, for example, has been severely cut back, and
even gutted.
In the criminal context, the Warren Court precedents have fared no
better. The Rehnquist Court has shifted the balance of advantage in the
criminal process strongly to the state. For example, restrictions on the
investigatory power of the police have been almost totally removed.
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures and Fifth Amendment bars against self-incrimination have been
narrowly construed. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel has also
been severely compromised. The ban on the death penalty has essen-
tially been removed. Moreover, Rehnquist, both as Chief Justice and as
head of the Judicial Conference of the United States, has attempted to
institute a series of procedural reforms that speed up that process. To a
large extent, he has succeeded. Nine hundred convicted persons have
been executed from 1976 through March 3, 2004.8
These changes, of course, are only a sample of the success that the
Rehnquist Court has had in destroying the vision and jurisprudence of
the Warren Court. To many, it is almost inconceivable that the judiciary
can continue to be a positive force in giving concrete meaning to our
constitutional values through reasoned analysis. For many members of
the profession, both in practice and in the academy, disaffection from
the federal judiciary runs deep. Under such conditions, therefore, it is
very difficult to pay respect to and admire the present body of constitu-
tional law. It is difficult to see how the courts, particularly the federal
courts, can continue to speak authoritatively to the burning issues that
divide us, and to attempt to ameliorate the great tensions in our society
when many feel so alienated from the courts. Yet, for the most optimis-
tic of us, it is always possible to believe that the federal courts will once
again become a source of moral authority and hope. Can we create a
new vision of what might be by looking at what was and what is?
In thinking about this predicament, I cannot help but think about
Owen Fiss. While he means many things to many of the participants in
this symposium, one of the most important aspects of his public life,
which touches us deeply and pushes the cynicism away, is his loyalty to
the federal courts both as an institution of justice and as an institution of
limited power. As a constitutional scholar, he resists these cynical views
of constitutional law tenaciously; he always remains faithful to the pros-
pect of achieving justice even within the confines of this dilemma.
His scholarship is an attempt to convince those who now reject law
7. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
8. See American Civil Liberties Union, Death Penalty, at http://www.aclu.org/DeathPenalty/
DeathPenaltyMain.cfm (last visited Mar. 7, 2004).
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that once again judges can and will perform their most important func-
tion - giving meaning to our public values through reason. By so
doing, his scholarship confronts more modem jurisprudential move-
ments, such as the Critical Legal Studies Movement, Critical Race Theo-
rists, Civic-Republicans, and the Law and Economics Movement, the
proponents of which, for various reasons, reject altogether Owen Fiss's
vision of law. For the past twenty-five years, he has analyzed the place
of adjudication in American life and defended the role of the judge as
the main instrument of public reason.9 His achievements speak for the
correctness of his views. His faith is the torch that helps sustain us dur-
ing these dark times.
There are, of course, other qualities of heart and mind that Owen
possesses, and that inspire me to use law both as an end in itself and as
an instrument for achieving justice. Owen Fiss's contributions to consti-
tutional law, to federal courts, and to the search for substantive justice
have many levels. His writings span a broad range of issues - free
speech, equality and desegregation, Supreme Court history, and various
strands of jurisprudence. He believes passionately in the values we
identify with freedom, liberty, and autonomy - equality, procedural
fairness, freedom of speech and the like - and he has attempted to
protect and perpetuate these values by writing and teaching about them
and acting on them whenever the opportunity presents itself.
Moreover, Owen is thoroughly devoted to the federal courts as a
co-equal branch of government. His articles and books reflect a set of
skills that attest to the details that constitute the law in a manner that is
meant to strengthen the courts in the eyes of the public and the profes-
sion alike. To Owen, this is significant both constitutively and instru-
mentally. He believes that opinions should be written in a technically
correct manner by employing the craft of law as an end in itself, and so
that opinions will enhance a court's capacity to do its socially important
work.
Perhaps even more significantly, Owen Fiss is, in the best sense of
the phrase, a constitutional law diplomat. He is a person who is capable
of grasping a multiplicity of conflicting principles, including some of
which are concerned with the health of our system of constitutional law
and the courts' role in protecting and perpetuating that system. At the
same time, he pushes the vision that a judge's duty is not merely to
speak to the law, but also to act on it. In his scholarship, Owen Fiss
always takes the high road and lives his life through principled judgment
and action. In his writings, Owen always selects his words in a way that
will minimize the confrontation with other branches of government. He
9. For a collection of his work, see OWEN Fiss, THE LAW AS IT COULD BE (2003).
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clearly understands that major reforms require a coordination of govern-
ment powers. He also respects the traditions of law, and thus follows
the principle of stare decisis - but not in a wooden way. Justice always
remains the overriding goal.
Owen Fiss is as much a great lawyer as he is a constitutional law
diplomat. The mastery of the craft of law requires a mixture of the theo-
retical and the technical. Owen Fiss is a master of both sets of skills.
He knows the cases, the statutes, and the theories behind them, and how
they interact. He also understands how the legal system works, how it
ought to work, and how to make it better. In his distinguished public
career as a constitutional scholar of the first order, Owen Fiss constantly
blends all of these remarkable skills.
I first met Owen Fiss in the early 1970s when I was a first-year
student at the University of Chicago Law School in what was inappro-
priately labeled a property class. What I soon discovered, however, was
that it was not a course in the technical aspects of property law but rather
a course in constitutional and moral theory. When I think about that
course and other classes I took from him, and when I think about his
scholarship, I am often reminded of a platonic dialogue - Gorgias -
which I teach in my jurisprudence course. To me, and I suspect many
others, the theory of that dialogue is another reason to celebrate Owen
Fiss's work.
Gorgias himself is a professor of oratory, and the dialogue opens
with a discussion between Socrates and Gorgias on the nature of his art.
It soon becomes clear, however, that the true concern of Gorgias is with
ethics, and its scope cannot be better indicated than by a quotation from
Socrates's concluding words.
All the other theories put forward in our long conversation have been
refuted, and this conclusion alone stands firm, that one should avoid
doing wrong with more care than being wronged, and that the
supreme object of [an individual's] efforts, in public and in private
life, must be the reality rather than the appearance of goodness.'
The dialogue is in fact a passionate defense by Socrates of the ideals for
which he gave his life: that man's business on Earth is to discover and
do what is right. To Socrates, therefore, it is better to suffer wrong than
to do wrong. If we ask what this ideal has to do with oratory, the answer
is that in Socrates's view it stands in direct opposition to the ends that
the oratorical training of the day was adapted to serve. Indeed, to Socra-
tes, a person will not be justified in embarking on a public career unless
she possesses a knowledge of moral values and a vision that will enable
her to improve the character of the community.
10. PLATO, GORGIAS 148 (W. Hamilton ed., 1960).
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Owen Fiss is one of the few people I have ever known who actually
attempts to live his life in harmony with the stringent moral and ethical
requirements envisioned by Socrates. As his scholarship and teaching
attest, Owen Fiss believes passionately in the importance of doing what
is right and in treating each person he encounters with respect and dig-
nity. He lives the Socratic ideal in all aspects of his public and private
life. He is a role model for his students and colleagues alike.
Perhaps his most outstanding characteristic is that he cares so
intensely. He cares about people, institutions, and ideas. Moreover, he
values people not for what they can give him but for their individual,
intrinsic worth. His loyalty to his friends is uncompromising and endur-
ing. This is so not out of habit, but because of the intensity and depth of
his feelings. He values ideas because they are good and important and
affect human beings, not simply because of the intellectual puzzles they
produce.
All of these positive attributes are reflected in his scholarship and
even in the critical comments of the symposium participants. To Owen,
constitutional law and adjudication is more than an object of scholarly
pursuit; it is an ideal of behavior between the state and the individual.
The adjudicative process is a method of giving meaning and content to
our social values. This symposium issue honors Owen Fiss for all of his
remarkable qualities.
[Vol. 58:1
